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Catching-up, Regional Disparities and 
Cohesion Policy: The Case of Hungary
Jörg Lackenbauer
Central and Eastern European countries (s) such as Hungary are
not only relatively backward with respect to the ‘old’  Member States
(-), but they are also witnessing a worrying rise of regional inequal-
ities within their boundaries. With the example of Hungary, we try to
identify the factors behind catching-up with the - in some regions
(‘winner regions’) and falling-behind in others (‘loser regions’). By its
very definition,  cohesion policy has to consider both problems (na-
tional catching-up vs. the containment of regional disparities) very care-
fully in the enlarged . This is a complex issue, as regional policies often
seem to face an equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ, as will bw shortly shown. On
the basis of this analysis, we discuss how  cohesion policy could con-
tribute to attain higher national growth and, at the same time, contribute
to the decrease in regional disparities. We use a theoretical approach that
combines an endogenous growth framework with a new economic ge-
ography. The model we use shows that – in contrast to the traditionally
used transport infrastructure policies – a policy that reduces the cost of
innovation or increases the diﬀusion of innovation is able to reduce re-
gional income inequality and agglomeration, and increase the national
growth rate. The regional policies involved could be primary subsidies
for research and technological development, investment in human cap-
ital or  infrastructure. In the final two sections of the paper, we dis-
cuss whether these regional policy prescriptions would fall on fertile soil
in the light of Hungary’s economic reality, and which could be promis-
ing  cohesion policy schemes that would incorporate an innovation-
oriented regional policy approach.
 Introduction
Since  May , the European Union has  Member States. The en-
larged  is heavily characterised by the great economic and social dif-
ferences between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Member States. Moreover, the
transition from centrally planned economies to market economies and
the ongoing integration with the  have led to a preoccupying rise of
regional inequalities within the Central and Eastern European countries
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(s) – these will be diﬃcult to reduce, too. Both problems pose a
major challenge to the Union – it is obvious that  Eastern enlarge-
ment may not and cannot leave unchanged the Community’s cohesion
policy, as currently embodied mainly by the Structural Funds and the
Cohesion Fund. Not only will there have to be a major reorientation of
this policy towards new key priorities that are most growth- (and thus
catching-up-) enhancing, but also a policy approach taking account of
the strongly increased regional disparities within the newMember States.
However, this issue has been neglected in the enlargement process, and
the European Commission’s proposals concerning the future priorities
of its regional and structural policy operations do not point towards any
major changes.
By its very definition,  cohesion policy has to address both problems
– national catching-up vs. the containment of regional disparities – very
attentively in the enlarged . This is a complex issue, as regional policies
often seem to face an equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. How can  cohesion
policy contribute to attaining higher national growth (and therefore con-
vergence towards the -) and, at the same time – and central to the
analysis in this paper – contribute to the decrease in regional disparities
(something that traditional infrastructure policies have hardly been ca-
pable of)? Which are the regional policy prescriptions that a theoretical
analysis yields? Are these prescriptions diﬃcult to put into practice? And
to what extent have they already been put into practice?
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section , we
shed light on the economic disparities between the new Member States
from Central and Eastern Europe and the -. In Section , we analyse
the growing regional disparities within the new Member States, with the
example of Hungary, our case study throughout this paper. The equity-
eﬃciency trade-oﬀ which regional policies often seem to face is looked
at in Section . In Section , we analyse in detail a theoretical case for an
innovation-oriented regional policy, and in Section  we question how
these regional policy prescriptions perform in light of Hungary’s eco-
nomic reality. In Section  we ask what could be the contribution of cur-
rent and future  cohesion policy schemes. Section  provides a brief
conclusion.
 Economic Disparities Between the Accession Countries
and the EU-
The former communist countries have lost out on at least half a century
of ‘normal’ economic development. The nature of their growth built seri-
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ous structural distortions into their economies, which made them highly
ineﬃcient, compared to Western Europe. The planning mechanisms in
place prior to  inhibited total factor productivity () growth. By
the eve of transition, ineﬃciencies and shortages were pervasive, labour
and capital fundamentally misallocated, and the range and quality of
goods and services produced left much to be desired (Dabrowski , ;
Doyle et al. , –). As a result, the ten s applying for  mem-
bership after the end of the Soviet system¹ revealed (and still reveal) huge
economic backlogs, especially in terms of  per capita: all of these
post-socialist new  Member States (with the exception of Slovenia)
are much less prosperous than the ‘old’  members (the -).
Although the new Member States have grown faster than the -
since the mid-s (see Table  for their real annual growth rates), the
gap in  per head remains pronounced: Slovenia and the Czech Re-
public were the only s that had a  per head above  per cent
of the - average in .  per head was only around  per cent
of that average in Poland, Estonia and Lithuania and just  per cent in
Latvia. In Bulgaria and Romania, who are likely to join the  in ,
 per head amounted to only around – per cent of the - av-
erage (European Commission , ).
Due to the accession of the ten new Member States on  May ,
the population of the  has risen from  million people to  mil-
lion people, i. e. by  per cent. However, the new Member States add
much more to  population ( per cent) than to its  (just around
 per cent in terms of Euros).² As a consequence, average  per head
is significantly reduced: in the -,³ it is around . per cent lower
than average  per head in the old -. But even in spite of this, all
of the new members from Central and Eastern Europe (with the excep-
tion of Slovenia) have a  per capita below  per cent of the -
average. Countries like Latvia and Lithuania (not to mention Bulgaria
and Romania) in  had a  per capita of around  per cent of
the - average, just above half the level in the ’s poorest old Mem-
ber States, Greece and Portugal (– per cent) (European Commission
, –).
Table  shows that all the s have a per capita  very far be-
low the - average. With the exception of Slovenia, the  of all of
these countries is even significantly below that of the least developed old
Member States (Portugal and Greece). Hence, under the current rules,
nearly all the regions in the s would be eligible for funding from
the ’s regional policy:⁴ some  million of the  million people who
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Table :  in the s: annual growth rates and the level relative to the -
 real (compound) annual growth rates  per capita in , level*
–     
Bulgaria –.% .% .% % % %
Czech Republic .% .% .% % % %
Estonia .% .% .% % % %
Hungary .% .% .% % % %
Latvia .% .% .% % % %
Lithuania .% .% .% % % %
Poland .% .% .% % % %
Romania –.% .% .% % % %
Slovakia .% .% .% % % %
Slovenia .% .% .% % % %
- % % %
* In percentage of -. Sources: European Commission b, ; European
Commission b, ; Podkaminer et al. , .
have become  citizens on  May  ( per cent of the total) live in
regions with  per head below  per cent of the - average in the
new Member States (European Commission , ).
Obviously, due to the low  per head in the new Member States,
income disparities across countries (and regions) in the  have clearly
widened. Whereas the gap between the average  per head in the -
 and the level in the least prosperous old Member States was just un-
der  per cent (i. e. Greece and Portugal had income levels almost 
per cent below the - average), the gap has doubled since enlarge-
ment: Latvia, the least prosperous new Member State, has a per capita
 which is roughly  per cent below the new - average (Euro-
pean Commission , ). The upcoming expansion to Bulgaria and
Romania will again increase the scale of disparities across the .
As Figure  shows, in the enlarged  of  (or even )Member States,
countries can be divided into three groups according to  per head in
 terms: the first group consists of  of the old  Member States (-
), whose  per head is well above the - average (by  per cent
or more). The second group consists of the ‘cohesion countries’ Spain,
Portugal and Greece plus Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and the Czech Repub-
lic. These countries’  per head is between  per cent and  per
cent of the - average. The third group comprises eight countries, all
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Figure :  per head (), , in three groups of countries
Source: European Commission , .
of which are from Central and Eastern Europe, being either new Mem-
ber States or accession candidates (Bulgaria and Romania). In this group,
 per head is below  per cent of the average (European Commission
, –).
The s have had sustained solid growth for several years (see Table
) and are likely to continue to outperform the old Member States in
terms of  growth (see e. g. Podkaminer et al. , ). Nevertheless,
it will take the ‘best performers’ among them  to  years and others
like Bulgaria, Romania and Poland even around  years from now to
reach only %of the - average, as growth and catching-up scenarios
which have been calculated e. g. by the World Bank () and by the
European Commission (b) have shown. This process is only slightly
shortened when the - average is taken as a point of reference.
In its latest report on economic and social cohesion (European Com-
mission ), the European Commission considers two catching-up
scenarios. In the first scenario, growth in the accession countries is sus-
tained at . per cent a year above the - average, i. e. above the growth
rates in the old Member States: a growth rate of  per cent a year in the
newMember States could be assumed, as opposed to a growth rate of .
per cent a year in the -. This seems to be quite a plausible assump-
tion, as it corresponds to what could be observed in reality in the recent
past: the average growth rate of  in the new Member States could be
eﬀectively maintained at . per cent a year above the - average be-
tween  and  (with  growth averaging just around  per cent
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Figure : Simulation of  per head () in the accession countries,
–; relative growth assumption . per cent p. a.
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Figure : Simulation of  per head () in the accession countries,
–; relative growth assumption . per cent p. a.
Note:  – new member states plus  and ;  – no data.
Source: European Commission , .
a year in the accession countries in that period, as opposed to an average
growth rate of . per cent in the - in the same time span). Given this
scenario, average  per head in the  countries (the ten new Member
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States plus Bulgaria and Romania) would remain below  per cent of
the - average until , as Figure  shows. In , it would exceed
 per cent of the average only in Slovenia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic
and Hungary. Slovakia would reach  per cent of the average in ,
Estonia in , Poland only in  –  years from now – and Latvia
only in . Bulgaria and Romania would still have a  per capita be-
low  per cent of the average even in , and this even if the point of
reference is the - average, which is considerably lower than the -
 average (not to mention the - average) (European Commission
, , –).
In the second scenario the European Commission analyses, growth in
the new Member States is sustained at . per cent a year above the -
 average (meaning that the annual growth rates in the s reach 
per cent if growth in the old Member States is . per cent). Intuitively,
this seems to be a less likely scenario and a very demanding task, because
since the outset of the transition process, only very few accession coun-
tries could permanently maintain their growth rate at . per cent above
the - average growth rate. Obviously, with growth being sustained
at a considerably higher rate than in the first scenario, convergence to 
average income levels would occur faster and in a shorter time span, as
Figure  shows. Poland, for example, would reach  per cent of the -
 average  per capita in roughly  years from now, instead of  as
in the first scenario (European Commission , –).
Both scenarios have one thing in common: they demonstrate that even
if growth rates well above the - average can be sustained for many
years, for most of the new Member States, catching-up even to just the
threshold of  per cent of the enlarged ’s average  per capita will
very likely be a long-term process.  cohesion policy will thus have to
respond to the greatest challenges since its inception, if the newMember
States are to be supported in their catching-up process and the Treaty
objectives of ‘economic and social cohesion’ achieved in an enlarged .
 Growing Regional DisparitiesWithin the New
Member States: The Case of Hungary
In this section we will focus on Hungary as a ‘case study’. Yet, regional
disparities increased in all of the transition countries, and many regional
patterns of Hungary are at the same time general regional patterns of the
East-Central European transformation of the last  years. Hence, much
of what can be said about Hungary, the dominant role of its capital city,
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the problems of its Eastern regions etc. could be equally said about other
new  members such as Poland, Slovakia or the Czech Republic.
The transformation of the s from centrally planned economies
to market economies, as well as the increasing economic integration
with the , have led to the creation of new spatial patterns of eco-
nomic disparities in these countries. Under the socialist system of cen-
trally planned economies, rapid industrialisation had been associated
with urbanisation in less-developed regions and an eﬀort to spread in-
dustrial/urban growth. As a consequence, a general tendency towards re-
gional economic convergence could be observed during the –
period. As market economic systems have been widely introduced and
the transition has been largely completed, the uneven spatial impact
of intense economic reforms and integration with Western Europe is
becoming more and more evident – widening disparities between and
within countries characterise the overall picture (Bachtler et al. , ).
Several studies (e. g. European Commission a; European Com-
mission ; Petrakos ) confirm that throughout the last decade
the accession countries witnessed increasing regional disparities. In its
latest report on economic and social cohesion, the European Commis-
sion (, ) finds that economic growth in the s has not been
regionally balanced. In all the new  Member States, ‘it has been dispro-
portionately concentrated in a few regions, particularly in capital cities
and surrounding areas. As a result, regional disparities in  per head
have widened significantly’ (, ).
Growing empirical evidence (e. g. Bachtler et al. ; European Com-
mission a; Petrakos ; Resmini ) points to one type of win-
ner and to two types of losers among the accession countries’ regions: in
this admittedly simplified dichotomy, the metropolitan and urban areas
(namely the capital city regions) belong to the former group, the rural
and old (declining) industrial areas as well as those in the Eastern pe-
ripheries belong to the latter group (Bachtler et al. , ; Iara and Trais-
taru , ). The regions bordering the old  members have developed
very dynamically in Hungary and Slovakia (where the region bordering
the  is at the same time the capital city region), but much less so in
other transition countries (Lammers , –). Hence, the devel-
opment of this ‘category’ of regions has to be judged in a case-related
manner. In Hungary, all these regional patterns of transformation into a
market economy became evident quite soon after the transition process
had set in.⁵
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The capital city regions of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Es-
tonia and Latvia play the most dominant core roles. In all of these coun-
tries, there is no centre that could rival the capital city. In the Czech Re-
public the disparity between Prague (which, in , had already reached
a level of  per cent of the average -  per capita, see European
Commission, a) and the remainder of the country is still increasing.
The new regional pattern that has emerged in Hungary as a conse-
quence of the transition process can be briefly characterised as follows:
economic growth became concentrated in a small number of metropoli-
tan and Western areas of Hungary, whereas a large number of regions
witnessed the erosion of their production capacity, and their potential to
grow and transform seemed to vanish.
Iara and Traistaru () find evidence for increasing regional manu-
facturing specialisation and increasing regional  diﬀerentials in
Hungary. On the basis of taxable income, Nemes-Nagy (, –)
has examined the change in intranational (i. e. interregional) income
dispersion at various levels of spatial aggregation for the end of the s
and roughly the first half of the s (the ‘transition decade’), i. e. the
years –. The spatial levels of the analysis are:
• seven planning-statistical regions (the proposed  ⁶ units);
•  counties and the capital, Budapest (  units, actual regional
authorities);
•  statistical microregions;
• , settlements, i. e. local authorities.
Table  shows that interregional income inequalities increased at all
levels of aggregation in Hungary between  and . In  and
, the figures show relative stability, albeit on a much higher level. Yet,
neither in Hungary nor in other transition countries did the increase in
interregional income inequalities come to a halt in  – it continued
during the second half of the s. Samecki (, ) e. g. finds that ‘be-
tween  and  the diversity between the most prosperous and the
least prosperous regions in the Member States of the - increased on
average by only %, while the average increase in this diversity in the
Visegrad group⁷ amounted to %.’ Table  shows the diversities mea-
sured as the ratio of  per capita at  between the richest and the
poorest region in the Visegrad group countries as well as in some ‘typi-
cal’ old  Member States.
Not only did regional disparities within the Visegrad countries sharply
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Table : Regional inequalities in taxable income per capita at various levels of spatial
aggregation: the case of Hungary
Years Weighted standard deviation
Settlements Microregions Counties Regions
 .% .% .% .%
 .% .% .% .%
 .% .% .% .%
 .% .% .% .%
 .% .% .% .%
 .% .% .% .%
 .% .% .% .%
 .% .% .% .%
 .% .% .% .%
Source: Nemes-Nagy (, ).
Table : Income disparities between the richest and the poorest region in the Visegrad
group countries and in some old  Member States
Country Most prosperous region Least prosperous region   
     
Poland Mazowieckie Lubelskie . . +%
Hungary Közep-Magyarország Észak-Alföld . . +%
Czech Republic Prague Strˇední Morava . . +%
Slovakia Bratislava Vychodne Slovensko . . +%
Ireland Border, Midland
&Western
Southern & Eastern . . +%
Italy Trentino-Alto Adige Calabria . . –%
Germany Hamburg Dessau . . –%
Belgium Brussels Hainaut . . +%
 – ratio / in /head (), ;  – ratio / in /head (), ;  – change
/ (from  to ). Sources: European Commission a; Samecki , .
increase, but they also reached a considerable level in absolute and rela-
tive terms (in spite of having been relatively low at the beginning of the
s due to the aforementioned reasons):as Table  shows, the ratios of
 per capita at  between their richest and their poorest regions are
already bigger than those of Italy (a country known for its huge interre-
gional disparities) and even approach the very special case of Germany
with its Western and Eastern parts. The European Commission (,
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Table : Typology of Hungarian regions under transformation
Position in the post-socialist transition and  integration process
Good Bad
Position
in the
socialist
economy
Good Positive continuity (‘the leaders’),
e. g. great urban agglomerations,
mainly the capital city
Negative discontinuity, e. g.
(old) heavy industry regions
facing massive restructuring
Bad Positive discontinuity (‘the
newcomers’), e. g. Western regions,
mainly those bordering old 
members like Austria
Negative continuity, e. g. the
‘Eastern Wall’, i. e. the Eastern
peripheries with Ukraine or
Romania as neighbours
Source: Gorzelak (, –).
) finds that ‘in Hungary, the level of  per head in the regions with
the most prosperous % of population is some . times the level in
the least prosperous’ – this is more than in any of the old  Member
States. More than before the transition process, Hungary is characterised
by an East-West divide, but also by a core-periphery disparity caused
by the economic dominance of Budapest (Bachtler et al. , ; Csé-
falvay , ). Gorzelak (, ) illustrates Hungary’s new regional
patterns (Table ).
    
 : ‘ ’
Budapest and the Western regions bordering Austria were able to benefit
from the transition process and the relocation of manufacturing activity
and investment: many new companies, massive inflows of  and rel-
atively low unemployment rates can be found in these areas. Generally
speaking, Budapest and Hungary’s Western parts are characterised by
good infrastructure links (e. g. the  motorway), a dynamically grow-
ing private sector activity and by a great number of international joint
ventures which act as connections to international networks (Bachtler
et al. , ; Horváth , ). Whereas Budapest has attracted basi-
cally tertiary activities (mainly financial services), the counties of Gyo˝r-
Moson-Sopron and Vas have become centres of specialised industrial
mass-production (Rechnitzer , ).
In the mid-s already, Budapest had more joint ventures than the
remainder of Hungary combined and nearly two-thirds of all  flow-
ing into Hungary went to Budapest (Bachtler et al. , , ). During
the s, the capital city could not only retain its advantage over the
rest of the country, but has further increased it. The Budapest agglomer-
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ation has thus strengthened its dominance (Horváth , ). In fact,
the Budapest region shows an outstanding performance with respect to
income growth, the employment level and structure. Hungary’s capital
city is the clear centre of the country’s service sector activity, with over 
per cent of Budapest’s total employment being now in the tertiary sec-
tor. Moreover, Budapest accounts for more than  per cent of Hungary’s
employees in research and development (Bachtler et al. , –). All
of this however includes mainly Budapest, geographically close counties
such as Nógrád or Pest were not able to benefit from Budapest’s dynamic
development.
Having been neglected for political-military reasons during the heavy
industrial stage of socialist industrialisation, the Austrian border regions
could enter the transition and  integration period with a less obsolete
and more flexible economic structure. In these Western regions, large-
scale investment from  and Hungarian companies transformed the
various counties (Gyo˝r-Moson-Sopron, Vas, Zala) into a zone of dy-
namic activity, even if, geographically speaking, they are a periphery.⁸
The complete opening of borders served as a catalyst for changes in the
spatial structure: cross border co-operation began to replace the state
monopoly and centrally organised international relations, massive 
inflows (especially greenfield investment) played a significant role in the
radical transformation of the regional pattern (Nemes-Nagy , –
; Nemes-Nagy , –). The most significant factors of economic
growth were thus the external activating eﬀects of the relatively close,
economically powerful South German, Austrian and North Italian re-
gions (Nemes-Nagy , ).
In the city of Gyo˝r, for example, situated exactly halfway between Vi-
enna and Budapest along excellent rail and road links, Hungary’s first
greenfield industrial site, the local business park, was opened already in
. Its geography and its well-educated and motivated workers have
been and still are Gyo˝r’s main selling points. The city could attract big
investors such as Audi, Philips and Amoco Fabrics. Even now that most
of the multinational investors are already there and only very few more
come, Gyo˝r still attracts investors, this time of another kind: often home-
grown companies, smaller, more diverse, requiring highly-educated peo-
ple, whereas the big manufacturers have upgraded their production lines
and added research and development (&) units. Like Gyo˝r, West-
ern Hungary in general is trying to ‘move up the value chain’ (Condon
, ).
Managing Global Transitions
Catching-up, Regional Disparities and  Cohesion Policy 
 ,     
  ,   
: ‘ ’
Rural, old (declining) industrial areas and Eastern and Southern periph-
eries have suﬀered from the closure of outdated, ineﬃcient firms and
from the deteriorating economic situation in the neighbouring regions
of Ukraine, Romania and Ex-Yugoslavia (Bachtler et al. , –; Iara
and Traistaru , –). Along Hungary’s Eastern and Southern bor-
ders, networks of illegal businesses sprang up: many economic activities
are illegal.
The Eastern periphery (e. g. the counties of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg
and Hajdú-Bihar) suﬀers from a regional crisis in themanufacturing and
agricultural industries which had been producing for the Soviet market:
three Eastern Hungarian industrial counties account for around  per
cent of the country’s total unqualified and unemployed workers. The em-
ployment power of the weak service sector is still far too low to absorb
those who lost their jobs due to the systemic change. The Southern bor-
der counties like Bác-Kiskun have been negatively aﬀected by the Balkan
crisis. Hungary’s Northern counties struggle with their obsolete heavy
industrial base (Nemes-Nagy , –; Nemes-Nagy , –).
In all those areas that had been dependent on heavy industry, the pri-
vatisation process started late (or didn’t start at all) (Rechnitzer ,
) and consisted essentially of investors picking out the (very few) big
companies that were viable.
In general, Hungary’s Southern, Northern and (North-) Eastern coun-
ties have comparatively poor infrastructure connections, small numbers
of joint ventures and a very weak private sector (Bachtler et al. , ).
Among other factors, it is the lack of favourable transport connections
that makes regions like North-East Hungary and the Great Hungarian
Plain far less competitive (Rechnitzer , ). Hungary’s Southern,
Northern and (North-) Eastern border regions are all peripheries, their
economic sources and potential are still moderate and limited (Rech-
nitzer , ).
      
   
The new regional patterns just described have been clearly a result of
the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, as well as a
result of the beginning of intense economic integration with the . Now
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that the transition process has been largely completed and Hungary has
reached a degree of trade integration with the  that even some old
members haven’t reached, we have to ask whether the evolved spatial
pattern of economic activities in Hungary is a transitional or rather a
permanent one.
It seems that the most dynamic Hungarian regions, i. e. Budapest and
the Western counties have built by now the basis for utilising their in-
creased indigenous potentials (the location advantage, the attraction and
weight of the market, innovative capacities etc.), which enables them to
benefit from sustainable endogenous regional development in the future.
Hence, the lead of those regions over the rest of the country seems rather
permanent. Yet, parallel to the development of the early s, some
multinational companies might close down their plants and move fur-
ther to the East, in order to benefit from lower wages there (Nemes-Nagy
, ). There are already first signs of  and economic activities
moving Eastward. Some companies that previously located in Western
Hungary are nowmoving to cheaper destinations (in  and , real
wages in Western Hungary have risen by more than  per cent) such as
Slovakia (Condon , ), but also to Eastern Hungary.
Besides such factors, the development of the lagging regions’ neigh-
bouring countries (Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia) is of crucial im-
portance for Hungary’s less developed counties. Domestic regional pol-
icy schemes have not yet been able to improve the situation of these lag-
ging regions (Nemes-Nagy , –). This is also due to the fact
that so far, Hungarian regional policy has taken to a large extent a ‘lais-
sez faire’ approach (Cséfalvay , ) and regional lobbies have not yet
developed (Rechnitzer , ). As future  cohesion policy interven-
tions will be substantially directed to Hungary’s disadvantaged counties,
and as those interventions traditionally take on more of a redistributive
approach (Cséfalvay , –), they might play a big part in trying to
improve their situation. Yet, neither international resources nor central
governmental funds alone will be able to make the lagging regions catch
up. Ultimately, the disadvantaged regions, too, will have to be able to
start a process of endogenous regional development, and local innova-
tive power will be of particular importance (Nemes-Nagy , ).
 Do Regional Policies Face an Equity-Eﬃciency Trade-oﬀ?
In Sections  and , we have shown that the enlarged  is heavily charac-
terised by the great economic and social diﬀerences between the old and
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the newMember States. Moreover, the transition from centrally planned
economies to market economies and the ongoing integration with the
 have led to a preoccupying rise in regional inequalities within the
s – these will be diﬃcult to reduce, too. Both problems pose a ma-
jor challenge to the Union. By its very definition,  cohesion policy has
to address both problems – national catching-up vs. the containment of
regional disparities – very attentively in the enlarged .
Literature on European economic integration (e. g. European Com-
mission ; ; Martin ; Lammers ; ) reveals that in
Western Europe there has been a certain degree of convergence on the
country level (i. e. between the  per capita of theMember States) over
the past decades. Indeed, there is clear evidence of national convergence
among the -’s Member States since the s. This is particularly
due to the catching-up process of the poorer Member States (European
Commission ; ).
The results of studies are much more ambiguous at the regional level
(Boldrin and Canova ). Even if there seems to be (weaker) conver-
gence at the level of all the - regions, quite a few authors (e. g. Quah
a) argue that diﬀerent groups or ‘convergence clubs’ are emerging,
so that apparent regional convergence is simply generated by the richer
and leading regions of the cohesion countries catching-up with the -
average, eﬀectively meaning that regional disparities within these coun-
tries increase.
Indeed, there is evidence that national convergence came along with
increasing interregional disparities (within countries): whereas since the
mid-eighties income inequalities amongMember States have diminished
by  per cent, regional inequalities within the Member States have gone
up by  per cent. As a result, the majority of regional inequalities in Eu-
rope can be explained by inequalities within countries (Martin , ).
Quah (b) finds that, among the cohesion countries (Greece, Portu-
gal, Spain and Ireland), Portugal and Spain, who managed to converge
toward the average   per capita, have also witnessed the most
marked rise in regional divergence.
Especially between  and , the cohesion countries’ convergence
process was quite impressive on the country level. In this period, (na-
tional) growth was well above the  average in Greece, Spain and Por-
tugal. This was translated into significant growth in  per head com-
pared to that in the rest of the , because their growth of population
was only slightly higher than the average. From  to , growth of
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 per head was over  per cent a year in Portugal and Spain, and just
under  per cent in Greece. This compares to an  average of just over 
per cent a year. Hence, in this period  per head in these three cohe-
sion countries together grew in real terms by nearly  percentage point a
year above the  average, and it increased to  per cent of that average
in  (in ) (European Commission , –).
However, the growth and convergence processes just described have
been far from regionally balanced. Davies and Hallet (, ) find a
correlation between high growth rates and a rise in regional dispari-
ties, especially in the s. Whereas Ireland and Spain have experienced
higher growth rates and a widening of regional disparities, Greece be-
fore  had a low growth rate (it even diverged with respect to the -
average) but also witnessed low/falling regional dispersion (Davies and
Hallet , ; Boldrin and Canova , ). The Spanish catching-
up process (on the country level) was driven by the particularly rapid
growth of its richest regions, especially Madrid and Cataluña, while other
regions were relatively falling behind. Since around  there has been
a gradual rise in regional disparities within Spain. The high growth rates
of Portugal in the s have been accompanied by a rise in regional dis-
parities during the second half of that decade (Davies and Hallet ,
–).
Summing up, there has been a certain degree of convergence on the
country level in the - in the past decades, also due to the catching-up
of the cohesion countries. Existing  cohesion policy schemes such as
the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund might have contributed to
this convergence of national economies, but could not avoid the increase
of regional inequalities within the (cohesion) countries.
In the new  Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, a very
similar development can be witnessed: there is a certain degree of con-
vergence with respect to the average -/-  per capita (see Table
), but regional disparities within Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary
etc. have been and still are increasing. In the accession countries, growth
of  averaged just over  per cent a year between  and  in all
except Hungary (just below) and the Czech Republic (where growth was
only just over  per cent a year). Over this period, growth of  per head
in real terms in the new Member States was around . per cent a year
above the - average (European Commission , ). This of course
led to a certain catching-up in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungarian
 per capita e. g. amounted to  per cent of the - average in ,
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Figure : The Williamson hypothesis: the inverted U-curve
Sources: Williamson , –; Davies and Hallet , .
to  per cent in  and is at roughly  per cent in  – at the same
time, interregional income inequalities within Hungary increased at all
levels of spatial aggregation in the s, as we have shown in Section .
However, not only in Hungary, but in all the transition countries, growth
has been disproportionately concentrated in a few regions (especially in
the main agglomerations such as the capital cities) and consequently re-
gional disparities in  per head have widened significantly (European
Commission , ).
In an early contribution, Williamson () provided a formulation of
the potential trade-oﬀ between national and regional development, pre-
dicting ‘increasing divergence among geographic units within national
borders and perpetuation of “pôles de croissance”’ (Williamson ,
) in catching-up countries, whereas later during the course of devel-
opment, ‘instead of divergence in interregional levels of development,
convergence becomes the rule’ (Williamson , ). According to the
Williamson hypothesis, the relationship between national growth and
regional inequalities takes the form of an inverted U-curve (Figure ).
Williamson’s main argument is that in the catching-up process of
countries, interregional linkages, factor movements and public policies
interact in favour of growth pole eﬀects and the main agglomerations.
Hence, more rapid growth in the growth pole areas (e. g. the capital city
regions) leads to an increase of regional disparities. In later stages of de-
velopment, however, regional disparities may decrease due to a higher
aggregate level of income and spread eﬀects: diseconomies of agglom-
eration (e. g. high labour costs or congestion eﬀects) may emerge in
the growth poles, and the lagging regions of the by now mature coun-
try might benefit from technological diﬀusion (Williamson , –;
Davies and Hallet , –).
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Most economists would probably classify the new  Member States
in Central and Eastern Europe under the heading ‘catching-up coun-
tries’: hence, in Williamson’s scheme, they would belong to the group
of countries experiencing increasing regional disparities, and they would
find themselves to the left of the income level * in Figure . This clas-
sification seems to be justified, because in the s public investment
is often focused on the main agglomerations, and the maximisation of
national growth (i. e. national catching-up) is mostly given priority, at
the expense of lagging, peripheral regions. In later stages, the priorities
may be shifted and given to spatial equity.
It is very likely that, thanks to the strong mechanisms of convergence
implied by deep economic integration, a certain degree of national con-
vergence towards  income levels will occur in the s. However,
further market integration in the context of  Eastern enlargement will
also foster divergence forces in the new  Member States and hence
lead to a further increase in regional disparities. Hence, the Community
and the (old and new) Member States will have to elaborate a cohesion
policy approach that is able to contribute to the catching-up process of
the s and, at the same time, to the containment of regional dispar-
ities within the new Member States. This task will have to go hand in
hand with a reorientation of the contents of cohesion policy, and with a
better management of the Funds. This is even more true in view of the
fact that firstly the  has firmly established the objective of ‘economic
and social cohesion’ in its policies,⁹ that secondly the huge widening of
regional economic disparities brought about by the Eastern enlargement
presents an unprecedented challenge for the ’s economic and social
cohesion, and that thirdly existing cohesion policy schemes have at best
contributed weakly to the convergence of national economies in Western
Europe in the recent past, but could not avoid the increase of regional
inequalities.¹⁰
Regional policies seem to face a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃ-
ciency, and policy makers seem to be confronted with the choice between
the objective to foster national catching-up and thus national growth and
eﬃciency or to decrease inequalities between the diﬀerent regions inside
countries and therefore enhance a balanced development and spatial eq-
uity. In the case of the acceding s, this suggests that it will be diﬃcult
to attain through these policies the objective of higher national growth
(and therefore convergence towards the -) and at the same time the
objective of a decrease in regional inequalities. Yet, the European Com-
Managing Global Transitions
Catching-up, Regional Disparities and  Cohesion Policy 
mission aims to achieve both objectives with its current policies, and jus-
tifies its regional interventions not only on equity grounds (see above),
but also on eﬃciency grounds – according to its First report on economic
and social cohesion, ‘the disequilibria indicate under-utilisation of hu-
man potential and an incapacity to take advantage of the economic op-
portunities that could be beneficial to the Union as a whole’ (European
Commission ). In its Third report on economic and social cohesion,
the European Commission (, vii–viii) takes up the same argument,
stating that ‘the cost of not pursuing a vigorous cohesion policy to tackle
disparities is, therefore, measured not only in terms of a loss of personal
and social well-being but also in economic terms, in a loss of the poten-
tial real income and higher living standards.’
This eﬃciency argument is much less clear than the equity basedmoti-
vation: It may demand more or less spatial concentration (and hence re-
gional inequalities) – on the one hand, there are the economic gains pro-
duced by agglomeration processes, and on the other there can be over-
agglomeration and congestion. According to the theories of new eco-
nomic geography and endogenous growth, eﬃciency gains (in terms of
economies of scale or localised technological spillovers) accrue from eco-
nomic agglomerations – and hence from an economic geography often
characterised by significant regional inequalities. The European Com-
mission might be wrong in thinking that containing regional disparities
will lead to a higher overall growth rate in the , hence to -wide ef-
ficiency gains. Indeed, the empirical evidence in Europe (convergence of
countries, divergence within countries/between regions) and the transi-
tion process in the s clearly tell another story: a trade-oﬀ between
equity and spatial eﬃciency appears inevitable.
One of the central aims of this work is to derive whether on theoretical
grounds (mainly on the basis of new economic geography and endoge-
nous growth theory) there is an approach to regional policy able to foster
the catching-up process of the s and, at the same time, take account
of the increased regional disparities within the new Member States. The
respective model will be developed in Section . It will be shown that
there is a cohesion policy approach able to reconcile the two objectives
of reduced regional disparities and a higher national growth rate or, in
other words, to solve the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ that cohesion policy
seems to face. However, only under certain conditions do these theo-
retical results have real-life economic policy implications, as we have to
scrutinise whether their main underlying assumptions and their results
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are compatible with the economic realities of Hungary – our ‘case study
country’ – and its accession to the .
 A Theoretical Case for an Innovation-Oriented
Regional Policy
Martin () shows that some regional policies, such as subsidies to
poor regions or the reduction of transaction costs within the poor re-
gion, can have unfortunate consequences, including a reduction in the
rate of growth, or the same eﬀect coupled with an increase in income
inequalities, or the relocation of firms to the richer regions. However, a
policy that reduces the cost of innovation, or increases the diﬀusion of
innovation, reduces regional income inequality and agglomeration, and
also increases growth.
Based on Martin (), we use a two-region theoretical scheme –
firms can locate either in the capital-rich region (in our case e. g. the cap-
ital city region of Budapest) or in the ‘poorer’ region (e. g. Borsod-Abaúj-
Zemplen, which is situated at the North-Eastern periphery of Hungary
and is one of the poorest Hungarian counties). The geographical con-
centration of firms in the rich region increases when transaction costs
between the regions fall. The logic (which is common to the approaches
of new economic geography, e. g. Krugman ) is that it is always more
profitable to produce in the richer area, the larger market, in order to
maximise the benefits of economies of scale. When transaction costs be-
tween the regions fall, businesses can then exploit these economies of
scale while also selling on the ‘small market’ now less protected by high
transaction costs.Moreover, when regional inequality in terms of income
increases, regional inequality in terms of spatial distribution of firms
(industrial agglomeration) likewise increases, since economies of scale
encourage firms to locate where demand is strongest and thus income
highest. Equilibrium geography is such that the profits of businesses are
identical in both regions, which eliminates any incentive to relocate. This
relationship, which can also be called the ‘home market eﬀect’, can be
written as follows (curve  in Figure ):
A = A(R), ()
where A(R) is a growing function of R and where A is an agglomeration
index (e. g. the ratio of the number of firms in the rich region to the total
number of firms). R is an index of inequality of regional incomes (e. g.
the ratio of income in the rich region to income in the poor region, hence
very similar to the ratio calculated in Table , see above).
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Spatial concentration in turn has an impact on the rate of innova-
tion and hence on the long-term growth of the overall economy, be-
cause the cost of innovation in the richer region falls as the agglomer-
ation of economic activities increases (due to positive externalities aris-
ing from spatial concentration, the existence of localised technological
spillovers etc.). In fact, geographical concentration of production activi-
ties increases opportunities to reduce the cost of innovation and conse-
quently to increase its rate of growth, with beneficial eﬀects for the terri-
tory as a whole. In endogenous growth models this is an equilibrium re-
lationship, because when the cost of innovation falls this induces new en-
trepreneurs/researchers to enter the innovation market (which is seen as
being competitive). This relationship between the long-term growth rate
and the agglomeration index – which can also be called the ‘spillovers
eﬀect’ – is shown by the following equation (curve  in Figure ):
g = g(A), ()
where g(A) is an increasing function of A, the index of industrial agglom-
eration.
The rate of innovation itself has an impact on regional income in-
equalities: a high rate of innovation accelerates market entry by new
businesses, which then compete with existing businesses and hence re-
duce their profits. One eﬀect therefore is to reduce existing incomes.
From this point of view, an increase in the rate of innovation reduces
income disparities between regions by reducing the profits of monopo-
listic firms, which are more numerous in a rich region. This last equilib-
rium relationship (‘competition eﬀect’) is encapsulated in the following
relationship (curve  in Figure ):
R = R(g), ()
where R(g) is a negative function of the growth rate g.
Figure  sums up these diﬀerent equilibrium relationships. The upper
part shows the spatial equilibrium, where income inequalities and indus-
trial agglomeration are determined. The curve  shows that agglomer-
ation tends to increase when income inequalities increase, because firms
locate in markets with high purchasing power (Equation ).
The curve  shows that when industrial agglomeration increases
competition intensifies, thereby tending to reduce the profits of monop-
olistic businesses and income inequality between regions (Eq. –). The
equilibrium level of agglomeration and the equilibrium level of income
inequality is indicated by the intersection of the two curves  and .
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Figure : Relationship between innovation, regional income inequalities
and agglomeration. Source: Martin , .
The lower part of the graph shows how spatial equilibrium in its turn
influences the rate of innovation. The equilibrium level of agglomeration
A is given by the spatial equilibrium. The curve  shows the positive re-
lationship between innovation and agglomeration, due to the existence
of localised spillovers (Equation ). The equilibrium rate of innovation
and the equilibrium level of income inequalities are indicated by the in-
tersection of the line A and the curve .
Martin (, –) shows that a simple monetary transfer (e. g. a
subsidy) from the richer region, say Budapest, to the poorer region, e. g.
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen county, ultimately reduces agglomeration and
income inequalities between the two, but it also reduces the national
growth rate:
R(g) A(R)  g(A)  .
This is hardly an eﬃcient outcome, in the truest sense of the word.
More often,  cohesion policy comes in the form of funding allo-
cated to the financing of (transport) infrastructure i. e. with the objec-
tive to reduce transaction costs and to bring remote regions closer to the
Single Market. The analysis of the economic impact of large-scale infras-
tructure investment depends largely on the question whether the invest-
ment leads to reduced transaction costs within the poorer region or to re-
duced costs between the regions. If the result is a reduction of transaction
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costs within the receiving region, increased eﬀective local demand for lo-
cally produced goods will attract new companies into this lagging region,
say Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen. Martin (, –) shows that in this case,
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen would benefit from reduced industrial agglom-
eration (manufacturing processes being now more dispersed), but the
innovation rate and hence the national growth rate would be lower. In
addition to this, regional disparities would increase, as firms in Budapest,
now facing fewer competitors, would increase their profits:
A(R)  g(A) R(g)  .
This example shows that industrial location disparities do not always
go hand in hand with regional income inequalities.
If, however, the infrastructure project contributes to reducing the
transaction costs between Budapest and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen, the op-
posite happens: Firms from Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen are encouraged to
move to Budapest, where they can exploit economies of scale, while con-
tinuing to sell their products in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen, thanks to the re-
duced transaction costs between Budapest and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen.
With competition in Budapest increasing, monopolistic business profits
and hence income inequalities between Budapest and Borsod-Abaúj-
Zemplen are ultimately reduced.
A(R)  g(A) R(g)  .
This agglomeration-increasing outcome can be found in numerous
authors’ articles (the most prominent maybe being Krugman ). The
seemingly paradoxical result: improving access to the lagging region via
transport infrastructure investment comes at the expense of the receiving
region that is even more deprived of industrial activities. This theoretical
result finds an empirical confirmation in the unsuccessful Italian eﬀorts
to foster economic growth in the Mezzogiorno (Martin , ; Faini
). Nearly half a century ago,Myrdal () formulated the same result
in his theory of ‘circular cumulative causation’.
In all the regional policy approaches looked at so far, there is an un-
fortunate consequence: a reduction in the rate of innovation and hence
in the country’s rate of growth (direct transfer/subsidy to the poorer re-
gion), or the same negative eﬀect together with an increase of regional
income disparities within the country (infrastructure projects within the
poorer region), or the relocation of companies to the richer region and
hence an increase in agglomeration (infrastructure projects connecting
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Figure : Eﬀect of a reduction in the cost of innovation or of an increase
in the diﬀusion of innovation. Source: Martin , .
the capital city region and the periphery). Thus, as indicated above, re-
gional policies evidently face a trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency –
none of the briefly described approaches to regional/cohesion policy is
able to reconcile the abovementioned trade-oﬀ.
Now it can be shown that, in contrast to a general transfer policy or a
diminution of transaction costs between the richer and the poorer area
or within the poorer area, a policy aimed at reducing regulatory barriers
to innovation or the costs of innovation makes it possible simultaneously
to achieve objectives of reducing regional inequalities and increasing the
rate of growth. The regional policies involved could be & subsidies,
education infrastructure or making capital markets more conducive to
new start-ups.
In this case (Figure ), it is the dynamic equilibrium (lower part of the
graph) that is first aﬀected. A reduction in the cost of innovation tends
to increase the rate of growth: The curve  (which shows the positive re-
lationship between innovation and agglomeration, due to the existence
of localised spillovers) shifts downwards (the rate of growth increases for
a given level of agglomeration). By boosting competition, this increases
the rate of innovation, reduces business profits and hence income in-
equalities between the two regions (again, we can think of Budapest as
the richer region and of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen as the poorer one). The
induced eﬀect means that spatial equilibrium is also aﬀected: The curve
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 (which shows that when industrial agglomeration increases compe-
tition intensifies, thereby tending to reduce the profits of monopolistic
businesses and income inequality between the regions) shifts leftward,
and industrial agglomeration in Budapest diminishes. In the final equi-
librium state, agglomeration and regional income disparities have di-
minished while the national growth rate has risen; the equity-eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ problem has been solved – there is hence a case for a cohesion
policy that reduces the cost of innovation or increases the diﬀusion of
innovation (Martin , –):
g(A) R(g) A(R)  .
Another policy can have the same eﬀects: An infrastructure-improve-
ment policy focusing on lowering the cost of conveying information
rather than the cost of transporting goods fosters the eﬀect of interre-
gional spillovers and hence enables the rate of innovation to be stepped
up, since the innovation sector benefits more from spillovers generated
by geographically remote firms. Such a policy would have the objective
of increasing the capacity of lagging regions to absorb new technologies
and to increase the spatial diﬀusion of innovation. This could be done
by financing infrastructure in information and communication technol-
ogy () and education. The impact is then similar to that illustrated in
Figure .
 Regional Policy Prescriptions of Martin ()
in Light of Hungary’s Economic Reality
 -  
  -   
Suppose a regional policy is implemented in a certain country, following
the ‘prescriptions’ of themodel ofMartin (), i. e. a regional policy re-
ducing the cost of innovation or increasing the diﬀusion of innovation.
As one of the desired outcomes, this policy leads to reduced interregional
disparities and a more balanced spatial pattern of economic activities,
hence less agglomeration. Yet, if the respective economy’s growth pat-
terns are characterised by a very high agglomeration-elasticity of growth
g (i. e. a growth function that is very responsive to changes in the pat-
terns of industrial concentration), the growth rate might increase only
insignificantly or not at all (even if it does not decrease).
In fact, during the whole transition process, Hungarian growth has
been and still is agglomeration-driven. The country’s very high agglome-
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ration-elasticity of growth is embodied by the absolutely dominant core
role of Budapest as its capital city region and, to a lesser extent, its West-
ern regions bordering Austria (see Section ). As in the Czech Repub-
lic or in Slovakia, there is no centre that could rival the capital city. In
the mid-s already, Budapest had more joint ventures than the re-
mainder of Hungary combined and nearly two-thirds of all  flowing
into Hungary went to Budapest, whereas the country’s peripheries are
characterised by high unemployment rates. As  growth, productivity
growth and employment are mainly created in the Budapest agglomera-
tion, it might be harmful to reduce agglomeration or do anything which
doesn’t have the best possible eﬀects on the country’s main growth pole
and its catching-up process.
Carried to an extreme, a spatial equity-oriented regional innovation
policy in Hungary might be tantamount to a renouncement of a higher
overall growth rate, and hence an impediment to the catching-up pro-
cess. This evidently would be an arguable – if not undesirable – out-
come. In this case, a regional policy that reduces the transaction costs be-
tween the richer region and the poorer one (e. g. by improving roads or
railways) might be preferable, as it implies reduced regional disparities,
a higher growth rate and increased agglomeration, which is ultimately
pushing up the overall (agglomeration-sensitive) growth rate.
In addition to this, the national catching-up process to - income
levels seems to be the priority for Hungarian as well as  policy mak-
ers, i. e. it seems to be more important than the immediate containment
of regional disparities within the country. A higher overall per capita in-
come level (even if very unevenly distributed across regions) might even
be a conditio sine qua non to be able to fight regional disparities and pos-
sible over-agglomeration at later stages of the development process. In
this case, any policy involving a renouncement of a higher overall growth
rate might be undesirable.
     
It is clear that we may not ask a too costly regional policy from Hungary,
i. e. one that would overcharge the country financially. As a transition
and  accession country, it has to set aside many Government funds
for reforms, environmental investment etc. In , the Hungarian Gov-
ernment reached a record budget deficit of . per cent of  (!), and
for  and  forecasts predict deficits of around  per cent – all
far beyond the Maastricht criterion of  per cent that the country will
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most likely have to stick to soon, if it wants to accede to Euroland. In this
context, any financial burden is problematic. If, however, the financial
burden of the policy were so high that – in the case of an innovation-
supporting regional policy as described above – the endogenous eﬀect
on incomes and geography dominates the exogenous eﬀect on the cost of
innovation, the net eﬀect on growthmight be negative. Hence, the cost of
such an innovation-oriented regional policy must not be too high (and
yet it is relatively likely to be), if (apart from the reduction of agglomera-
tion and regional inequalities) the desired impact on the national growth
rate is to be positive. Thus, in the framework of its cohesion policy, the
 will have to continue to considerably co-finance its poorer countries’
regional policy projects. Distinct calls for lower  co-financing (in or-
der to increase the receiving regions’ ‘sense of ownership’) run contrary
to the financial feasibility of a true regional innovation and education
policy in Hungary.
   , &  
  
Hungary has – like the other s – a developed educational system and
a relatively solid base of science and technology (&). The education
levels are comparatively high, especially concerning scientific and techni-
cal skills. The Hungarian skills and competence base oﬀers good oppor-
tunities for competitive research, development and manufacturing clus-
ters. In addition to this, it is higher education that facilitates technology
transfer (e. g. Tondl and Vuksic ). Contrary to other s, agricul-
ture is not more important than in the - countries, and Hungary has
a higher share of sophisticated engineering industries and a lower share
of labour-intensive industries than other  countries such as Portugal
or Greece. Even if Hungary partly still lacks appropriate domestic strate-
gies to continuously support technological change, innovation processes
and related training measures, it has taken a more proactive approach
to & policy and technology-related education in the second half of
the s and in recent years: the & Policy College of the Hungar-
ian Government has presented a ‘Science and Technology Policy ’
programme, and very recently, the governmental programme ‘A Chance
for the Future’ has placed the focus on computer skills, teleworking and
the development of small and medium-sized enterprises () – just to
mention two examples. And yet, the overall picture is not that bright . . . .
The programmes just mentioned seem to be more than justified, be-
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cause in Hungary – as in other accession countries – the former cen-
trally planned, simple ‘linear model’ of innovation had been widely dis-
solved and made obsolete: the country’s & system has suﬀered from
a decline both in government support and in industrial research – dur-
ing the s, the & system lost more than half of its industrial re-
searchers. In the first half of the s, & expenditure per unit of 
sharply decreased, and only slowly stabilised thereafter. Publicly funded
scientific facilities and research institutes are still hardly integrated into
private companies’ innovation activities, which anyway are weak. High-
tech production is still limited to very few specific regions and sectors,
and has not spread to the country or industry as a whole. Even if there are
many skilled workers, engineers and highly educated scientists in Hun-
gary, their competencies have been partially made obsolete by the sys-
temic change and economic restructuring (Meske and Weber ).
At the outset of the transition and accession process in Hungary, major
hopes for knowledge spillovers, technology transfer and innovation were
pinned on foreign direct investment (). Multinational corporations
were expected to be multipliers of modern production and management
know-how in the country. These hopes cherished by many Hungarians
have been broadly dashed: even if  might contribute to aggregate
output growth (Tondl and Vuksic ) and overall labour productiv-
ity, there is much evidence that foreign owned companies in Hungary
– due to their strong technical superiority – operate in virtually iso-
lated ‘cocoons’. There are hardly any technological spillovers, and 
has not played the role of an innovation-stipulating means for domes-
tic firms (Günther ). Foreign companies are hardly willing to ‘give
access’ to innovations. By buying up domestic companies, they rather
absorb knowledge than distribute it. Typically, products and technolo-
gies are imported by the foreign companies, and so are their production
inputs – there is hardly any room for Hungarian &. The technolog-
ical disparities between the Western multinationals and the Hungarian
economy have not decreased. On the contrary, they seem to be deepen-
ing (Farkas ). Hence, the situation of innovation, & and techno-
logical knowledge in Hungary has hardly been improved by the massive
inflows of  so far.
Fromwhat has been said, it seems that the use of indigenous capacities
in investments, skills and science has to be broadly strengthened. If 
doesn’t play a multiplier role concerning technological innovation and
knowledge spillovers, then those domestic capacities have to be enhanced
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involving academia, research institutions, enterprises and regional au-
thorities, in order to develop the kinds of networks that have contributed
to the competitiveness of many - regions (Meske and Weber ).
Hungary has to take an ‘endogenous’ approach to regional policy (e. g.
Cappellin ), consisting of interregional innovation networking, in-
tense co-operation between the diﬀerent counties, the improvement of
information and communication links for technology transfer,  de-
velopment, vocational training for the labour force etc. But still, the
number of enterprises producing for local markets is low, and so is the
co-operation between the producers and between the counties (Rech-
nitzer , ).
Summing up, the approach advocated by Martin (), i. e. poli-
cies supporting e. g. innovation diﬀusion, & subsidies, the creation
of small high-tech sectors and human capital only partially fall on fertile
soil in Hungary, as the country’s innovation, & and scientific edu-
cation system is still in a problematic situation – the environment for
high-tech production and technological innovation has to be improved,
before such a regional policy approach really can bear fruit.
     ’
?
What has just been said is even more true for Hungary’s peripheries,
i. e. the North-Eastern, Eastern and most Southern regions of the coun-
try. In those regions, that had strongly depended on heavy industries
in the socialist period, the decline and disappearance of outdated en-
terprises has made the workforce’s skills mismatch even worse. Three
Eastern Hungarian industrial counties account for around  per cent of
the country’s total unqualified (and unemployed) workers. Even if there
were  in those regions, and even if the foreign companies were ‘will-
ing’ to give access to innovations, the lack of higher education would
make technology transfer highly diﬃcult. In the counties of Pest, Nó-
grád and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg there are significantly fewer education
places than on average in Hungary (Rechnitzer , ). Hence, in these
areas, extended funding for training measures and technology- as well
as computer-related education is strongly needed, and so are qualified
teachers and a better equipment of schools with modern computers, of
companies with modern machinery etc. Any form of technological de-
velopment can only be adopted if those who are supposed to adopt it can
be directly familiarised with it. However, in Hungary’s peripheries, there
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is a lack of even the most elementary information and communication
infrastructure (and transport infrastructure, too).
Yet, the Government has begun to deal with the problems of the most
lagging regions, also with respect to their technological backwardness.
The aforementioned Government programme A Chance for the Future
aims at improving the most disadvantaged regions’ development, em-
ployment and innovation potential. In this context, especially support
to the education infrastructure would be an important regional policy
approach, as information and communication infrastructures or &
subsidies could only be utilised if workers, engineers, scientists etc. were
adequately qualified.
The nearly complete lack of  inevitably requires Hungary’s lagging
regions to take on an ‘endogenous’ approach to regional policy. Even if,
as described above, the conditions for that have to be clearly improved,
a regional innovation policy even in the country’s periphery is not a
hopeless venture. The Government has made some important steps, e. g.
also by supporting many business incubators and innovation centres in
backward regions with high unemployment (Gulácsi ). More regions
(and nearly all the lagging ones) than in any other accession country have
become active members of the Innovating Regions in Europe () Net-
work, which aims at interregional networking on regional innovation
policies, best-practice exchange etc. And yet, a true regional innovation
policy and the creation of small high-tech sectors will only be successful
if the transport infrastructure as well as the business opportunities are
improved and the education and training systems renewed.
     :
    
The huge sums spent in the framework of the ’s Structural and Cohe-
sion Funds (roughly  billion  in the financial framework –
, which is a third of total  spending) have traditionally aimed at
financing public infrastructures, mainly transportation infrastructures.
This approach has been partly justified by the considerable disparities in
infrastructure in the  and the objective to bring remote regions closer
to the Single Market. In addition to this, there is a deeply entrenched be-
lief in Brussels that the so-called Trans-European Networks (s), i. e.
mainly roads and railways connecting diﬀerent  Member States, are
one of the most important engines for growth. They are prioritised, as
they are seen to create a ‘pan-European value-added’. The ‘growth initia-
tive’ of the Italian  Presidency in the second half of , which placed
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the emphasis on investment in transport infrastructure, produces testi-
mony of this belief.¹¹ Pinzler () questions why these measures of all
possible measures should foster growth – in fact, the  doesn’t provide
any reasonable explanation.
This conviction is being exported to the new Member States: the so-
called ¹² list is seen as the most important economic and regional
policy priority in Central and Eastern Europe (e. g. Tartler ). In their
National Development Plans for the first three years of  membership
(–), the accession countries hardly prioritise &, innovation
policy and human resources development, but instead emphasize infras-
tructure projects. Poland e. g. only foresees  per cent of  support for
education and human capital, whereas  per cent (!) of the Funds are
supposed to be set aside for (partially prestigious) infrastructure projects
(Samecki ). The figures for Hungary are not very diﬀerent – in its fa-
mous ‘Széchenyi Plan’, a National Development Plan presented in ,
the Hungarian Government dedicated  billion  to motorway con-
struction, more than for innovation policy,  development and re-
gional development policy together. So, after all, it doesn’t look as if the
prescriptions of the model of Martin () and other theorists and em-
piricists really have a fair chance of being considered as viable alternative
approaches for long-term growth, competitiveness and spatial equity. In
the political economy of shifting priorities, the law of inertia undoubt-
edly applies – and to hope that this will soon change would be a rather
illusory claim.
 What can EU Policies Do?
AndWhat Are They Already Doing?
What are the lessons of the model discussed? What could be promising
starting points to incorporate these new priorities into already existing
 cohesion policy schemes? For the new  Member States and their
regions, two sources of  regional funding are particularly relevant: the
Structural Funds’ Objective  funding and the Cohesion Fund. All the
regions that have a  per capita below  per cent of the  average
 per capita are eligible for Objective  funding, and all the countries
whose  per capita is below  per cent of the  average are eligible
for support from the Cohesion Fund. As we have shown in Section ,
all the new Member States currently meet the conditions for support
from the Cohesion Fund. Moreover, nearly all their regions (with very
few exceptions) are eligible for Objective  support.
In – – as in previous periods – both the Structural Funds’
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Objective  and the Cohesion Fund are setting the major focus on infras-
tructure measures, namely transport infrastructure. Between  and
, . billion Euros are spent under the heading of Objective  –
clearly more than half of the overall  cohesion policy budget, which
amounts to roughly  billion Euros in the same period. . per cent
of these . billion Euros of Objective  funding are spent on infras-
tructure (especially transport infrastructure), whereas only . per cent
are spent on research, technological development and innovation. The
Cohesion Fund doesn’t dedicate any money at all to research and in-
novation: it is equally split between infrastructure and environmental
investments (European Commission c, ). This clearly violates the
regional policy prescriptions which we derived in Section , and which
would be able to overcome the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ that regional
policies often seem to face.
However, the projects supporting research, technological develop-
ment and innovation in the framework of Objective  funding could
be promising starting points to incorporate the new priorities derived in
Section  into already existing  cohesion policy schemes. The Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund () innovative actions contribute
to the implementation of regional innovation strategies (/+)
throughout the . The three strategic themes of the innovative actions
co-funded by the  are:
• regional economies based on knowledge and technological innova-
tion;
• e-EuropeRegio: the information society at the service of regional
development;
• regional identity and sustainable development (European Commis-
sion ).
Moreover, the European Social Fund is an important pillar of  cohe-
sion policy: it contributes to human resource development, modernises
the education systems and provides funding for vocational schooling,
taking account of the emergence of the knowledge-based economy.
Yet, these important and promising programmes are not suﬃciently
emphasized and funded. The budget of the  innovative actions e. g.
amounts to only . per cent of the  budget, which corresponds
to approximately  million Euros over the entire period –
– compared to  billion Euros spent on infrastructure projects under
Objective  funding alone (European Commission ; European Com-
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mission c, ). Too much money is still invested in financing high-
ways and prestigious infrastructure projects (with temporarily positive
Keynesian eﬀects). It is clear that investment in physical infrastructure
will remain of utmost importance in the s for years to come – yet,
on its own it can not enable lagging regions or countries to catch up,
and, as the model above has shown, it might have very unfortunate con-
sequences. Cohesion policy in the accession countries will have to take a
more complex approach: human skills have to be adapted, & and in-
novation as well as the knowledge-based economy have to receive more
attention, and employment opportunities in the services sector must be
created.
The Irish growth miracle’s determinants confirm the essential con-
tributions that , ‘knowledge/technology sourcing’, investment in hu-
man capital and  can make to foster productivity growth (maybe the
most essential and prevalent objective for the s), catching-up as well
as regional and social cohesion. Not by chance, Ireland was among the
countries that allocated the biggest proportion of Structural Funds to
human resources development, high-tech oriented education and voca-
tional schooling –  per cent.
Unfortunately for the first three years of  membership (–),
in many accession countries’ National Development Plans it doesn’t
seem that the priorities of &, innovation policy and human resources
development are being properly addressed. As shown above, Poland e. g.
only foresees  per cent of  support for education and human cap-
ital, whereas  per cent (!) of the Funds are supposed to be set aside
for infrastructure projects. Expenditure on education as a share of 
is more than  per cent lower in the s than in the -. Expen-
diture on & as a share of  is  to  times higher in the  than
in the Visegrad group (Samecki , –). If the - is to take seri-
ously the Lisbon agenda of economic modernisation and competitive-
ness (e. g. European Commission b), these data could soon become
a big problem. Hence, there is broad room for reflection and improve-
ment in the run-up to the next generation of  cohesion policy and
national regional policies as well as the next  budgetary framework
(–).
Finally, we should briefly ask the question why, after all, the location of
economic activities has become such an important policy issue in the ,
but not in the United States. Or, in other words, why is it that regional
income disparities are much more important in the  than in the ?
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The most important reason for this is the marked mobility of economic
agents in the , whereas in Europe workers are hardly mobile, not only
among countries, but also among the regions within a country. Whereas
the workers in the United States follow the companies (and thus con-
tribute to the adjustment of regional inequalities), the ‘European model’
is to move activities to where the people are rather than to move people
to where the companies (and hence the jobs) are located.
Since European economic agents do not follow mobile capital from
regions in decline to regions experiencing growth, the problem of re-
gional disparities is so acute. Hence, housing and tax policies that facili-
tate the mobility of workers should be strengthened and fully regarded as
regional policies. In transition countries such as Hungary, the State has
completely withdrawn from the construction of state rentals and con-
dominiums, and the end of the rent controls has made rented flats too
expensive. New housing construction has dramatically declined and the
housing shortage inherited from the old regime has become pervasive.
The privatisation of State rentals and gradually increasing rents have
aggravated this general housing shortage. Problems of over-occupancy,
rent arrears, evictions and homelessness havemultiplied during the tran-
sition process (Sailer , –). As a result, workers’ mobility has
nearly come to a standstill, which is one of the most important reasons
for growing regional unemployment and income disparities. Whereas,
e. g. in Hungary’s Western counties, employers already lament a lack of
workers, in the Eastern parts of the country unemployment reaches more
than  per cent (Rosenkranz ) – and yet the workers don’t move.
Given the inertia of what has been called the ‘European model’ above,
it seems to be an illusory claim to voice our support for a mobility and
housing policy on equal footing. It has to be clear, however, that the spe-
cialisation of regions in certain industries suggests that low-intersectoral
mobility of workers increases the welfare cost of spatial concentration.
Policies involved to increase intersectoral mobility could be adequate
housing schemes and policies as well as education and training policies,
i. e. policies that have also been recommended above (Martin , ;
Martin ).
 Conclusions
This paper has highlighted the two big challenges  cohesion policy has
to face in an enlarged Europe. On the one hand, due to the legacy of the
socialist era, there is a general economic and social backwardness in Cen-
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tral and Eastern Europe with respect to the old  Member States (with
very few exceptions). Hence,  cohesion policy will have to contribute
to the catching-up of the new Member States’ economies if the Treaty
objectives of economic and social cohesion are to be respected. On the
other hand, the transition from centrally planned economies to market
economies and the ongoing integration with the  have led to a pre-
occupying rise of regional inequalities within the s. In this respect,
Hungary is a ‘typical’ example. By its very definition,  cohesion policy
has also to address this problem very attentively.
Yet, in many ways, regional policies seem to face a trade-oﬀ between
equity and eﬃciency. In the case of the acceding s, this suggests
that it will be diﬃcult to attain through these policies the objective of
higher national growth (and therefore convergence towards the -)
and at the same time the objective of a decrease in regional inequali-
ties. The theoretical approach discussed in this paper shows that some
regional policies can have unfortunate consequences, including a reduc-
tion in the rate of growth, or the same eﬀect coupled with an increase
in income inequalities, or the relocation of firms to the richer regions.
However, a policy that reduces the cost of innovation, or increases the
diﬀusion of innovation thereby reduces regional income inequality and
agglomeration, and increases the national growth rate. The regional poli-
cies involved could be & subsidies, investment in education and 
infrastructure or making capital markets more conducive to new start-
ups.
Some promising  programmes already exist in this direction. How-
ever, they are clearly neither suﬃciently funded nor recognized by the
s as a key priority for productivity growth and competitiveness.
In order to take adequate account of what can be most generally called
‘globalisation’,  cohesion policy’s focus on large-scale, direct business
support and infrastructure projects ought to give way to ‘softer’ policy
approaches, i. e.  development, the creation of employment oppor-
tunities or the fostering of innovation. Adequate housing policies and
approaches increasing workers’ mobility would also bemost appropriate.
Notes
. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
. Bulgaria and Romania will add a further  per cent to  population,
but under  per cent to  (!) (European Commission , ).
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. - includes the eight accession countries from Central and Eastern
Europe plus Cyprus and Malta (i. e. all the countries that acceeded on
 May ).
. Currently, regions whose per capita  is less than % of the  av-
erage are eligible for ‘Objective ’ structural funding. Countries whose
per capita  is less than % of the  average are eligible for sup-
port from the  Cohesion Fund.
. Clearly, Hungary’s new spatial patterns follow the organic, histori-
cally born pre-socialist spatial structure, in which the division line
was the Danube River: in the regions West of the Danube, more in-
dustrialised areas following (Western) European trends had evolved
before World War , whereas in Eastern Hungary agriculture had al-
ways been the dominant factor in shaping the economic structure.
Whereas the Western Hungarian regions could build on their histori-
cal, market-oriented development in the s, EasternHungary’s her-
itage of a large socialist monocultural company system transformed
that part of the country into a crisis zone (Hrubi , –).
.  stands for Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques.
This nomenclature of territorial units was drawn up to be a single,
cohesive system of territorial groupings for the compilation of  re-
gional statistics. The  nomenclature subdivides the  economic
territory into regions at three diﬀerent  levels.
. The Visegrad group consists of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia.
. In economic terms, Hungary’sWestern ‘periphery’ can’t be considered
a periphery – together with Budapest, it should rather be considered
the most dynamic part of the country.
. Article  of the Treaty establishing the European Community states
that ‘in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the
Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the
strengthening of its economic and social cohesion. In particular, the
Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of de-
velopment of the various regions and the backwardness of the least
favoured regions or islands, including rural areas.’
. Overall many authors (e. g. Boldrin and Canova ; Boldrin and
Canova ; Arevalo ; Ederveen et al. ) criticise the lack of
eﬀectiveness of current  regional and structural policy schemes.
. More generally, the  priority transport infrastructure projects that
have been suggested by the ‘High Level Group on the Trans-European
Network’ chaired by former  Commissioner Karel van Miert,
amount to an investment volume of  billion  (!). And yet,
they’re a done deal: the European Transport Ministers have voted pos-
itively on the list.
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.  stands for Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment (papers
initiated by the European institutions).
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